During the bleak winter of 1944, as the Allied forces advanced into Germany, Adolf Hitler conceived a daring plan to turn the tide of war: the Ardennes Counteroffensive, famously known as the Battle of the Bulge. A critical component of this ambitious strategy was the swift capture of bridges across the Meuse River. Hitler understood that speed was paramount. Delay would allow the Allies to regroup and solidify their defenses, effectively thwarting the German advance. To ensure this vital element of surprise and speed, he entrusted Obersturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny with a clandestine and audacious mission: Operation Greif. This operation, while not directly focused on the typical World War 2 German Officer Uniform, became infamous for its deceptive use of enemy attire.
Otto Skorzeny, a figure already legendary for his daring rescue of Benito Mussolini, was summoned to Hitler’s headquarters in October 1944. This new assignment was to be even more audacious than his previous exploits. Skorzeny was tasked with forming and leading a special commando unit. This unit was to operate in conjunction with the 6th Panzer Army, spearheading the northern thrust of the offensive. Their objectives were multifaceted: seize crucial Meuse bridges, and sow disarray and confusion behind Allied lines through espionage and sabotage.
The core of Skorzeny’s plan hinged on deception. He proposed utilizing English-speaking German soldiers disguised in World War 2 German officer uniform… no, wait, that is incorrect. Crucially, the deception involved equipping these soldiers with captured US Army uniforms and equipment. Hitler, drawing a false equivalence, claimed the Allies had employed similar tactics. He reassured Skorzeny that wearing American uniforms was only a violation of the laws of war if combat was engaged while disguised. This dubious legal interpretation set the stage for Operation Greif.
Skorzeny established his command post at Grafenwöhr, Germany. With a mere six weeks to prepare, the task was immense. Hitler promised unlimited resources, a typical exaggeration that proved hollow. The promised American equipment was scarce – a paltry collection of jeeps, trucks, halftracks, and a single Sherman tank. To compensate, Panzerbrigade 150, Skorzeny’s main combat force, was cobbled together using approximately 70 German tanks cleverly camouflaged to resemble American armored vehicles. These “Ersatz M10” tanks, German Panther tanks modified to resemble American M10 tank destroyers, became a symbol of the operation’s resourcefulness and inherent deception.
A significant security lapse occurred when Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel issued a Wehrmacht-wide call for English-speaking volunteers for Skorzeny’s special unit. Around 2,000 men responded, but Allied intelligence also took note. Surprisingly few volunteers possessed genuine English fluency. Only a handful were truly fluent, with a few dozen capable of basic conversation. Skorzeny formed Einheit Stielau from the best English speakers – reconnaissance teams of two to six men, equipped with jeeps, radios, and demolition gear. Most lacked commando experience, and the rushed training was rudimentary at best.
Rumors, fueled by the secrecy and unusual nature of the operation, circulated among the commandos. The most persistent and damaging rumor was that their mission included the assassination of General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Despite Skorzeny’s attempts to dispel it, the rumor spread, even reaching American intelligence. Ironically, this unfounded rumor became Operation Greif’s most impactful, albeit unintended, success.
When the Ardennes Offensive commenced on December 16, 1944, reports of German soldiers in American uniforms operating behind Allied lines surfaced rapidly. These reports, often exaggerated, created widespread panic and significantly overestimated the actual number of commandos. However, enough disguised soldiers were captured to make the threat seem genuine and substantial. Many captured commandos, under interrogation, repeated the assassination rumor, leading to heightened security for senior Allied commanders. Generals Eisenhower and Bradley were forced to limit their movements, remaining largely confined to headquarters, which hampered their ability to effectively manage the initial German assault.
While the threat to Eisenhower and other generals was overblown, Einheit Stielau achieved some success in sowing chaos. One team, posing as military police at a road junction, misdirected an entire American regiment. Another team successfully severed communication lines between General Bradley’s headquarters and the First US Army command post. Though the number of commandos was too small to execute all the attributed actions, their sabotage, both real and imagined, disrupted the Allied response and significantly impacted morale. The psychological effect was substantial, fueled by the fear of the unknown and the erosion of trust. The sight of any soldier in a World War 2 German officer uniform or any uniform for that matter, became suspect.
The initial German offensive achieved surprise, but quickly bogged down against unexpectedly fierce Allied resistance. Panzerbrigade 150’s effectiveness relied on rapid penetration, which would allow the disguised troops to infiltrate deeply. This rapid advance never materialized. By the second day, Skorzeny recognized the operation’s strategic failure and repurposed the brigade as a conventional unit attached to the 1st SS Panzer Corps. Skorzeny’s direct involvement ended abruptly when he was wounded by artillery fire near Ligneuville, Belgium.
Meanwhile, Einheit Stielau continued their mission, but most were either killed or captured by increasingly vigilant American forces. Only a single team managed to return to German lines. On December 18, 1944, in Awaille, Belgium, US troops apprehended three members of Einheit Stielau: Oberfähnrich Günther Billing, Obergefreiter Wilhelm Schmidt, and Unteroffizier Manfred Pernass. A military commission convened on December 21 at the First US Army’s Master Interrogation Center in Belgium. They were tried and convicted on two charges: violating the laws of war by wearing American uniforms in a combat zone and acting as spies by gathering intelligence while disguised. The commission recommended the death penalty for all three.
Colonel E. M. Brannon, the Staff Judge Advocate, reviewed the proceedings and upheld the verdict. Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges, commander of the First US Army, approved the sentences. The executions were carried out by firing squad on December 23, 1944. This swift and harsh justice reflected the fear and anger generated by Operation Greif and the perceived violation of the rules of warfare. The stark contrast between the World War 2 German officer uniform, a symbol of conventional military engagement, and the deceptive American uniforms worn by Skorzeny’s men, highlighted the perceived treachery of the operation in the eyes of the Allies.
Skorzeny’s accountability for Operation Greif came after the war’s end. He surrendered in May 1945 and spent two years in prison awaiting trial. While senior Nazis at Nuremberg faced severe penalties, Skorzeny’s trial at Dachau in August 1947 took a surprising turn. He admitted his role but, with the help of his defense attorney, Colonel Robert Durst, argued that American troops had also worn German uniforms, citing instances during the fighting in Aachen. He maintained his orders were to remove American uniforms before engaging in combat.
Crucially, Wing Commander Forest Yeo-Thomas, a British agent known as “The White Rabbit,” provided unexpected testimony. He described his own escapes from German captivity while disguised in enemy uniforms, arguing that Skorzeny’s actions were no different. The court, operating under international laws of war, accepted the argument that wearing enemy uniforms was only a war crime if combat occurred while disguised. Based on this interpretation and Yeo-Thomas’s testimony, charges against Skorzeny were dropped.
Skorzeny escaped from prison in 1948 and lived a controversial post-war life, rumored to have connections with intelligence agencies and political figures. He died in 1975, leaving behind a legacy as a daring commando and a figure of considerable controversy. Operation Greif, while strategically insignificant in the larger context of World War 2, remains a fascinating case study in military deception and the psychological impact of unconventional warfare. It serves as a stark reminder that even the most recognizable symbols of military identity, like the World War 2 German officer uniform, can be subverted and manipulated in the pursuit of strategic advantage, blurring the lines of conventional warfare and raising complex ethical and legal questions.
