During the planning stages of the ambitious Ardennes Counteroffensive, commonly known as the Battle of the Bulge, Adolf Hitler recognized the crucial need to secure bridges across the Meuse River. Speed was paramount to his strategy, which aimed to divide Allied forces, cross the Meuse, and advance towards Antwerp. Failure to swiftly capture a Meuse bridge would allow the Allies to regroup and fortify their defenses west of the river. To overcome this obstacle, Hitler assigned Obersturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny a clandestine mission: Operation Greif.
In October 1944, Hitler summoned Skorzeny to his headquarters, entrusting him with this critical operation. Skorzeny, known for previous daring missions like the rescue of Benito Mussolini, was tasked with a significantly larger and more complex undertaking. He was to assemble and train a special commando unit to operate alongside the 6th Panzer Army, the spearhead of the offensive’s northern advance. Their objectives extended beyond bridge capture to include espionage and sabotage, designed to create confusion and disruption within the Allied rear lines.
Central to Skorzeny’s plan was deception: deploying German soldiers in US Army uniforms and utilizing American equipment. Hitler asserted that the Allies themselves had employed similar tactics and reassured Skorzeny that wearing enemy uniforms was only a violation of the laws of war if combat occurred while disguised.
Grafenwöhr, Germany, became the hub for Skorzeny’s preparations. Facing a tight six-week deadline, the task was immense. Hitler promised unlimited resources, a typical exaggeration for the Ardennes Offensive. The promised American equipment fell far short of expectations. Skorzeny received only a limited number of jeeps, trucks, halftracks, and a single Sherman tank. To compensate, Panzerbrigade 150, Skorzeny’s main combat force, was equipped with approximately 70 German tanks, cleverly camouflaged to resemble American armored vehicles.
A knocked out Ersatz M10 with both its hull and turret American markings displayed, showcasing the German attempt to mimic the appearance of US military vehicles during the Battle of the Bulge. Photo Source
A significant security lapse occurred when Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel issued a Wehrmacht-wide appeal for English-speaking volunteers for Skorzeny’s special unit. Around 2,000 men responded, inadvertently alerting Allied intelligence. However, most volunteers possessed minimal English skills. Only ten were fluent, and a few dozen more could manage basic conversation. Skorzeny formed Einheit Stielau from the best English speakers, a reconnaissance unit of two-to-six-man teams equipped with jeeps, radios, and demolition gear. Lacking commando experience and with minimal training time, these men were hastily prepared for their perilous mission.
Rumors of an assassination plot targeting General Dwight Eisenhower spread among the commandos during training. Despite Skorzeny’s efforts to dismiss them, these rumors persisted and reached American intelligence. Ironically, this rumor became Operation Greif’s most impactful element. As the counteroffensive commenced on December 16, 1944, reports of German soldiers disguised in American uniforms infiltrated Allied lines. These reports, though exaggerating the number of disguised soldiers, were substantiated by captured commandos. Many confessed to assassination missions targeting senior Allied officers, causing Generals Eisenhower and Bradley to restrict their movements and remain in headquarters. This self-imposed isolation significantly hampered the Allied response to the German offensive.
While the threat to Allied generals was overstated, Einheit Stielau achieved some success in disrupting Allied operations. One team, posing as military police at an intersection, redirected an entire regiment. Another team severed communication lines to General Bradley’s headquarters. Although the number of commandos was insufficient to execute all attributed actions, their sabotage, both real and imagined, contributed to the initial Allied disarray and impacted morale.
The German counteroffensive initially surprised the Allies but soon faced unexpectedly strong resistance. Panzerbrigade 150‘s success depended on a swift breakthrough, allowing disguised units to penetrate American lines. This rapid advance did not materialize. By the second day, Skorzeny recognized the operation’s failure and repurposed the brigade as a conventional unit attached to the 1st SS Panzer Corps. Skorzeny’s direct involvement ended abruptly when he was wounded by artillery fire near Ligneuville, Belgium.
Wilhelm Schmidt, Günther Billing, and Manfred Pernass, captured German soldiers who were part of Operation Greif, photographed after their apprehension by American forces. Courtesy of The National World War II Museum.
Meanwhile, Skorzeny’s commandos continued their mission, but most were killed or captured. Only one team returned to German lines. On December 18, 1944, US troops apprehended three Einheit Stielau members in Awaille, Belgium: Oberfähnrich Günther Billing, Obergefreiter Wilhelm Schmidt, and Unteroffizier Manfred Pernass. A military commission convened on December 21 at the First US Army’s Master Interrogation Center in Belgium. They were tried and convicted for violating the laws of war by wearing American uniforms in a combat zone and for espionage while disguised. The commission recommended the death penalty.
German infiltrators, dressed in German Soldier Uniforms but having operated in US Army uniforms, are lined up for execution by firing squad after being convicted by a military court for wearing U.S. uniforms during the Battle of the Bulge, December 23, 1944. Photo: https://rarehistoricalphotos.com/german-commandos-captured-american-uniform-1944/
Colonel E. M. Brannon reviewed the proceedings and upheld the court-martial’s findings. Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges, First US Army commander, approved the sentences that afternoon. The executions were carried out the following morning, December 23, 1944.
Skorzeny faced accountability for Operation Greif after the war. He surrendered in May 1945 and spent two years in prison awaiting trial. While senior Nazis at Nuremberg faced severe penalties, Skorzeny’s trial began in Dachau in August 1947. He admitted his role in the operation, but his defense, led by Colonel Robert Durst, argued that American troops had also worn German uniforms, citing the Aachen fighting. Skorzeny maintained he ordered his men to remove American uniforms before engaging in combat.
Crucially, Wing Commander Forest Yeo-Thomas, a British agent known as “The White Rabbit,” testified in Skorzeny’s favor. Yeo-Thomas recounted his own escape from German captivity by using enemy uniforms as disguise, arguing the similarity to Skorzeny’s operation. The Dachau court, unlike the military commission that condemned Schmidt, Billing, and Pernass, operated under international laws of war, which only criminalized combat while disguised in enemy uniforms. Based on this legal interpretation and Yeo-Thomas’s testimony, charges against Skorzeny and his co-defendants were dropped.
Skorzeny (left), pictured with President of Argentina Juan Perón (center), later in life, after his controversial wartime activities involving the use of German soldier uniforms for deception. Photo: Wikimedia Commons
Skorzeny remained imprisoned until his escape in July 1948, allegedly with US assistance. He later lived in Spain, Argentina, and was even rumored to have collaborated with the Mossad. He died of lung cancer in 1975, and his ashes were returned to Vienna for a memorial service attended by former SS officers. Otto Skorzeny remains a figure of controversy, viewed by some as a war criminal and by others as a daring commando pioneer, forever associated with the audacious, and ultimately fraught, use of the German soldier uniform in Operation Greif.
