During the tumultuous years of World War Two, the German military machine, known as the Wehrmacht, was instantly recognizable by its distinctive uniforms. These uniforms, from the field grey of the Heer to the stark black of the Panzer crews and the camouflage patterns of the Waffen-SS, were symbols of German military power. However, in a daring and controversial operation known as Operation Greif, some of these very uniforms became tools of deception, blurring the lines of conventional warfare. This operation, conceived by Adolf Hitler and executed by the audacious Otto Skorzeny, involved German soldiers donning US Army uniforms to infiltrate Allied lines during the Battle of the Bulge, sowing confusion and attempting to seize vital bridges.
In late 1944, with the Allied forces pushing relentlessly towards Germany, Hitler planned a desperate counteroffensive in the Ardennes forest. A crucial element of this ambitious plan was speed. To achieve a swift breakthrough, capturing intact bridges across the Meuse River was paramount. Delay would allow the Allies to regroup and thwart the German advance. To ensure this vital element of surprise and speed, Hitler turned to Obersturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny, tasking him with Operation Greif.
Skorzeny, already renowned for his daring rescue of Benito Mussolini, was summoned to Hitler’s headquarters in October 1944. This new mission was unprecedented in scale and complexity. He was to form and train a special commando unit that would operate ahead of the main German advance, spearheaded by the 6th Panzer Army. Their objectives were ambitious: seize Meuse bridges and create havoc in the Allied rear through espionage and sabotage.
The cornerstone of Skorzeny’s plan was deception – exploiting the very image of the enemy. He proposed using English-speaking German troops disguised in authentic US Army uniforms and equipment. Hitler, referencing alleged Allied use of similar tactics, reassured Skorzeny that wearing enemy uniforms was only a war crime if combat occurred while disguised. This dubious legal loophole became the basis for Operation Greif, pushing the boundaries of military conduct and raising ethical questions about the use of German uniforms in such a deceptive manner.
Grafenwöhr, Germany, became the hub of Skorzeny’s clandestine preparations. With a mere six weeks to prepare Panzerbrigade 150, time was of the essence. Hitler promised unlimited resources, a typical exaggeration that proved untrue. The promised American equipment was scarce – only a handful of jeeps, trucks, halftracks, and a single Sherman tank materialized. To compensate, Skorzeny’s brigade was equipped with approximately 70 German tanks, Panthers modified and camouflaged to resemble American armored vehicles. These “Ersatz M10s,” while visually similar at a distance, were a far cry from genuine US equipment, highlighting the logistical challenges of such a complex deception.
Image alt text: Knocked-out German Ersatz M10 tank in Battle of the Bulge, disguised as American M10 Wolverine tank destroyer with US markings, showcasing German attempts at uniform and equipment deception.
Adding to the operational challenges, a significant security breach occurred. Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel issued a Wehrmacht-wide call for English-speaking volunteers for Skorzeny’s special unit. Around 2,000 men responded, but Allied intelligence also took notice. Most volunteers had minimal English proficiency. Only ten were fluent, and a few dozen more possessed basic conversational skills. The best English speakers formed Einheit Stielau, a reconnaissance unit of small teams equipped with jeeps, radios, and demolition gear. Commando experience was lacking, and training was rushed.
Rumors circulated among the commandos, fueled by the secrecy and unusual nature of the operation, that their mission included assassinating General Dwight Eisenhower. Despite Skorzeny’s attempts to dispel these rumors, they persisted and reached American intelligence. Ironically, this misinformation became Operation Greif’s most significant, albeit unintended, success.
When the Ardennes Offensive commenced on December 16, 1944, reports of German soldiers in US uniforms spread rapidly, amplified by captured commandos who, under interrogation, spoke of assassination squads targeting senior Allied officers. This led to a gross overestimation of the number of infiltrators, but the perceived threat was very real. Generals Eisenhower and Bradley were forced to remain confined to their headquarters, significantly hampering Allied command and control during the critical early stages of the German assault. The psychological impact of German soldiers operating behind Allied lines, indistinguishable in their stolen uniforms, was substantial, breeding paranoia and suspicion.
While the assassination plot was unfounded, Einheit Stielau did achieve some disruptive successes. One team, posing as military police, misdirected an entire US regiment. Another severed communication lines to General Bradley’s headquarters. Though their numbers were small, the actions of these disguised German soldiers, and the exaggerated fear they generated, contributed to the initial Allied confusion and slowed their response. The sight of German soldiers in seemingly American uniforms created an atmosphere of uncertainty and distrust, undermining morale.
However, the German counteroffensive soon faltered against unexpectedly stiff Allied resistance. Panzerbrigade 150’s effectiveness hinged on a rapid breakthrough, allowing disguised units to penetrate deeply into American lines. This swift advance never materialized. By the second day, Skorzeny recognized the operation’s strategic failure and repurposed the brigade as a conventional combat unit attached to the 1st SS Panzer Corps. Skorzeny himself was wounded in action shortly after.
Image alt text: Captured German commandos, Wilhelm Schmidt, Günther Billing, and Manfred Pernass, in US Army uniforms after Operation Greif infiltration, highlighting the tangible consequence of using enemy uniforms for deception.
Meanwhile, Skorzeny’s commandos continued their mission, but most were captured or killed. Only one team returned to German lines. Three members of Einheit Stielau, Oberfähnrich Günther Billing, Obergefreiter Wilhelm Schmidt, and Unteroffizier Manfred Pernass, were apprehended in Awaille, Belgium, on December 18, 1944. A US military commission swiftly convened on December 21. They were charged with violating the laws of war by wearing American uniforms in a combat zone and acting as spies while disguised. The commission recommended the death penalty for all three.
Image alt text: Execution of captured German infiltrators by US firing squad during Battle of the Bulge, a stark illustration of the severe consequences of using US uniforms for disguise in Operation Greif.
Colonel E.M. Brannon, Staff Judge Advocate, reviewed the proceedings and upheld the verdict. Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges, First US Army commander, confirmed the sentences. The executions were carried out on December 23, 1944. These executions served as a harsh warning about the ramifications of using enemy uniforms in warfare, reflecting the outrage and fear generated by Operation Greif.
Skorzeny’s accountability for Operation Greif came after the war. He surrendered in May 1945 and spent two years in prison before his trial in Dachau in August 1947. He admitted his role but argued that American troops had also worn German uniforms (during the Aachen fighting) and that he had ordered his men to remove US uniforms before engaging in combat, attempting to exploit the narrow legal definition of war crimes related to military disguise.
Unexpectedly, Wing Commander Forest Yeo-Thomas, a British agent, provided crucial testimony. He recounted his own escapes from German captivity while disguised in enemy uniforms, arguing the similarity to Skorzeny’s tactics. The Dachau court, operating under international laws of war, acquitted Skorzeny and his co-defendants, accepting the legal interpretation that wearing enemy uniforms was only a war crime if combat occurred while disguised. This controversial verdict highlighted the complex legal and ethical ambiguities surrounding the use of military uniforms in deception operations.
Image alt text: Otto Skorzeny after WWII, pictured with Juan Perón, highlighting Skorzeny’s post-war life and the controversial legacy of his wartime operations involving German uniforms and deception tactics.
Skorzeny escaped denazification court in 1948 and lived a controversial post-war life, linked to various intelligence agencies and political figures. He died in 1975, leaving behind a legacy as a daring commando and a figure of enduring controversy. Operation Greif and the use of German uniforms as a tool of deception remain a significant, and ethically debated, chapter in the history of World War Two, illustrating the extreme measures taken in the conflict and the blurring lines of conventional warfare in the face of desperation.
