When Adolf Hitler conceived the strategy for the Ardennes Counteroffensive, later known as the Battle of the Bulge, a critical objective was securing at least one intact bridge across the Meuse River. Speed was paramount to Hitler’s ambitious plan to split the Allied forces, cross the Meuse, and advance to Antwerp. Failure to swiftly capture a Meuse bridge would allow the Allies to regroup and fortify their defenses west of the river. To overcome this challenge, Hitler entrusted Obersturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny with a daring mission: Operation Greif.
In October 1944, Hitler summoned Skorzeny to his headquarters, tasking him with a highly secretive operation. Skorzeny, already known for leading covert missions, including the rescue of Benito Mussolini, was to undertake an even more audacious and complex assignment. He was to assemble and train a special commando unit to operate alongside the 6th Panzer Army, the spearhead of the northern offensive. Their mission extended beyond bridge seizure to espionage and sabotage, aimed at creating widespread confusion within the Allied rear lines.
Skorzeny’s strategy hinged on deception. He planned to utilize English-speaking German soldiers disguised in US Army uniforms and equipment. Hitler himself pointed out that the Allies had employed similar tactics. He reassured Skorzeny that such disguise would only constitute a violation of the laws of war if German soldiers engaged in combat while in enemy uniforms.
Grafenwöhr, Germany, became the operational base for Skorzeny’s command. With a mere six weeks for preparation, the task was immense. Hitler promised unlimited resources, a pledge that, like many others related to the Ardennes Offensive, proved exaggerated. The promised American equipment was scarce, amounting to only a few jeeps, trucks, halftracks, and a single Sherman tank. To compensate, Panzerbrigade 150, Skorzeny’s main combat force, was equipped with approximately 70 German tanks camouflaged to resemble American armored vehicles.
A knocked out Ersatz M10 with both its hull and turret American markings displayed.
Adding to the operational challenges, a significant security breach occurred. Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel issued a Wehrmacht-wide appeal for English-speaking volunteers for Skorzeny’s special unit. Around 2,000 men responded, but Allied intelligence also took note. Most volunteers had limited English proficiency; only ten were fluent, and a few dozen could manage basic conversation. Skorzeny selected the best speakers to form Einheit Stielau, a reconnaissance unit of two-to-six-man teams equipped with jeeps, radios, and demolition gear. Crucially, most lacked commando experience, and the six-week training period was insufficient for thorough preparation.
Rumors soon circulated among the commandos, fueled by speculation, that their mission included assassinating General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Despite Skorzeny’s attempts to dispel these rumors, they persisted and reached American intelligence. Ironically, this rumor became Operation Greif’s most significant, albeit unintended, success. When the Ardennes Offensive commenced on December 16, 1944, reports of German soldiers in American uniforms operating behind Allied lines quickly spread. These reports, though exaggerating the number of disguised commandos, were substantiated by captured infiltrators, making the threat appear real. Many captured commandos, possibly to sow further discord, claimed assassination squads were targeting high-ranking Allied officers. This led Generals Eisenhower and Bradley to limit their public appearances, significantly hindering their command effectiveness during the critical early stages of the German offensive.
While the threat to Allied generals was overstated, Einheit Stielau commandos successfully sowed chaos. One team, posing as military police at a road junction, redirected an entire regiment. Another team severed communication lines between General Bradley’s headquarters and the First US Army command post. Although the number of commandos was too small to execute all attributed actions, their acts of sabotage, real and imagined, disrupted the American response and negatively impacted morale. The psychological impact of German soldiers operating in ww2 uniforms german behind Allied lines was considerable.
The German counteroffensive initially surprised the Allies, but quickly lost momentum due to unexpectedly strong resistance. Panzerbrigade 150’s effectiveness was predicated on rapid advancement, creating opportunities for disguised infiltration. This rapid advance did not materialize. By the second day, Skorzeny recognized the operation’s faltering progress and repurposed the brigade as a conventional unit attached to the 1st SS Panzer Corps. Skorzeny’s direct involvement ended abruptly when he was wounded by artillery fire near Ligneuville, Belgium.
Wilhelm Schmidt, Günther Billing, and Manfred Pernass, after their capture by American troops.
Meanwhile, Einheit Stielau commandos continued their mission, but most were either killed or captured by American forces. Only one team successfully returned to German lines. On December 18, 1944, US troops apprehended three Einheit Stielau members in Awaille, Belgium: Oberfähnrich Günther Billing, Obergefreiter Wilhelm Schmidt, and Unteroffizier Manfred Pernass. A military commission convened on December 21 at the First US Army’s Master Interrogation Center in Belgium. They were charged with violating the laws of war by wearing American uniforms in a combat zone and acting as spies while disguised. The commission recommended the death penalty for all three.
German infiltrators lined up for execution by firing squad after conviction by a military court for wearing U.S. uniforms during the Battle of the Bulge. December 23, 1944.
Colonel E.M. Brannon, the Staff Judge Advocate, reviewed the proceedings and upheld the court-martial’s verdict. Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges, First US Army commander, approved the sentences. The executions were carried out on December 23, 1944.
Otto Skorzeny’s accountability for Operation Greif came after the war. He surrendered to the 30th Infantry Regiment in May 1945 and spent two years in prison awaiting trial. While senior Nazi officers at Nuremberg faced severe penalties, Skorzeny’s trial at Dachau in August 1947 took a different turn. He admitted his role in Operation Greif, but his defense, led by US-appointed Colonel Robert Durst, argued effectively. Durst highlighted instances of American troops using German uniforms, such as during the Aachen fighting, and Skorzeny maintained he ordered his men to remove American ww2 uniforms german before engaging in combat.
Crucially, Wing Commander Forest Yeo-Thomas, a British agent known as “The White Rabbit,” provided surprise testimony. He recounted his own escape from German captivity by disguising himself and fellow prisoners in enemy uniforms, arguing the situation was analogous to Skorzeny’s operation. Unlike the military commission that condemned Schmidt, Billing, and Pernass, the Dachau court operated under international laws of war, which only criminalized combat engagement while disguised in enemy uniforms. Based on this legal interpretation and Yeo-Thomas’s testimony, the court acquitted Skorzeny and his co-defendants.
Skorzeny (left) with President of Argentina Juan Perón (center).
Skorzeny remained imprisoned pending denazification court proceedings until his escape in July 1948, reportedly aided by former SS officers in US military police uniforms. He later claimed US assistance in his escape. In 1952, living in Spain, Skorzeny was recruited by a former German general with CIA connections to train the Egyptian army. He subsequently resided in Argentina, rumored to advise President Juan Perón and guard his wife. In the 1960s, he was allegedly recruited by Mossad, though his motives and missions remain debated. He died of lung cancer in 1975 and was cremated in Madrid. His ashes were returned to Vienna for a memorial service attended by former SS officers. Otto Skorzeny remains a controversial figure, viewed by some as a war criminal and by others as a daring commando pioneer. His Operation Greif, and the use of ww2 uniforms german for deception, remains a significant and debated episode of World War II.
