Russian Navy Uniforms and the US Civil War: A Story of Alliance

During the tumultuous years of the American Civil War, global powers maintained a posture of official neutrality. However, beneath the surface of international diplomacy, a remarkable relationship blossomed between the United States and Russia. While European monarchies largely favored the Confederacy, Russia, under Tsar Alexander II, extended a hand of unexpected friendship to the Union. This alliance, driven by pragmatic geopolitical considerations, culminated in the dramatic arrival of the Russian Atlantic and Pacific Fleets in American waters in 1863, a move that resonated deeply both politically and socially. The sight of these imposing warships, and the distinguished Russian Navy Uniforms of their officers and crews, became a symbol of international support during a critical period for the United States.

A broadside view of several ships, possibly of the Russian Navy, at anchor. This image aims to visually represent the Russian Navy’s visit to the United States during the Civil War, showcasing the naval power that arrived as a symbol of support.

The outbreak of the Civil War in 1861 presented a complex international landscape. While proclamations of neutrality were issued by Great Britain, France, Spain, and other maritime nations, these actions were perceived with suspicion in the North. Neutrality, in practice, granted recognition to the Confederate flag at sea and afforded Confederate ships the same privileges in neutral ports as those of the Federal government. Many European powers harbored vested interests in the fragmentation of the United States. A divided nation would diminish a burgeoning commercial rival and potentially weaken the Monroe Doctrine, opening opportunities for European colonial ambitions in the Americas.

Great Britain, with its landed aristocracy sympathetic to the Southern states and its strategic interest in a less powerful United States, found neutrality expedient. France, under Napoleon III, driven by aspirations of global power and colonial expansion in Mexico, was overtly anti-North and saw a divided America as advantageous. Even Spain, with its recent occupation of Santo Domingo, hinted at recognizing the Confederacy should the US challenge its actions. Prussia, while officially neutral, saw its populace largely sympathetic to the Union cause, with many volunteering to serve in the Union Army.

Amidst this climate of European ambivalence or outright hostility, Russia stood apart. The Tsarist regime, seemingly an ideological opposite to the democratic North, displayed a strikingly friendly attitude. This unlikely alignment was rooted in a confluence of factors, primarily realpolitik. Russia, like the United States, viewed Great Britain as a potential rival and sought to counterbalance British influence. A strong and unified United States served Russia’s strategic interests in maintaining a global balance of power.

Furthermore, both nations faced internal challenges that fostered a sense of shared experience. Just as Lincoln grappled with secession, Tsar Alexander II confronted a rebellion in Poland. This parallel was noted in a PUNCH cartoon depicting Lincoln telling the Czar, “We air in the same fix, I calculate, / You with your Poles, with Southern rebels I.” The Polish uprising of 1863, met with harsh Russian suppression, drew criticism from France, England, and Austria, further isolating Russia and drawing it closer to the United States, which notably refrained from joining European condemnation.

A sepia-toned photograph depicting a group of formally dressed Russian naval officers. This image represents the command structure of the Russian Atlantic Squadron, highlighting the leadership responsible for the historic visit to the United States.

Adding to this complex tapestry of international relations were economic considerations. Both the United States and Russia were pursuing paths of industrial development behind protective tariff barriers, contrasting with Great Britain’s free trade policies. The US Congress’s passage of the Morrill Protective Tariff Act in 1861 resonated positively in Russia, where protectionism was favored. This economic alignment further solidified the nascent bond between the two nations.

In a note sent to his Minister in Washington, D.C., Prince Gortchakov, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, conveyed the Tsar’s “lively solicitude…in presence of the dangers which menace the American Union, and the sincere wished which His Majesty entertains for the maintenance of that great work.” This message, widely publicized, boosted morale in the North and signaled Russia’s unequivocal support. When Confederate efforts to gain recognition from Russia faltered, it became clear that the Tsar’s government was firmly aligned with the Union.

The autumn of 1862 marked a perilous juncture for the Union, with the looming threat of foreign intervention. France, under Napoleon III, actively sought British and Russian cooperation in proposing an armistice and lifting the blockade of Southern ports. However, Russia, while willing to participate to avoid being excluded from a Franco-British initiative, ultimately signaled its disinclination to intervene in a way that would irritate the United States. Great Britain, observing the outcome of the Battle of Antietam, which led to Lincoln’s preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, ultimately decided against mediation, effectively averting European intervention. It was Britain’s decision, more than Russia’s stance, that proved decisive in preventing foreign entanglement in the Civil War.

Against this backdrop of diplomatic maneuvering and the ever-present threat of intervention, Russia undertook a bold and unprecedented action: dispatching its Atlantic and Pacific Naval Squadrons to the United States. In September 1863, these fleets arrived in New York and San Francisco, respectively, coinciding with the Union’s turning tide of war after victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg. The fleets remained in American waters for approximately seven months.

The decision to send the fleets was ostensibly driven by strategic concerns. Grand Duke Constantine, General-Admiral of the Russian Navy, had formulated plans to deploy the navy in the event of war with European powers. Russian ships, primarily wooden and sail-rigged with auxiliary steam engines, were no match for the modern British navy. However, they could be effectively used as commerce raiders. The deployment to neutral ports like New York and San Francisco would prevent the Russian fleet from being trapped in ice-bound or British-controlled waters and position them strategically for potential action against enemy shipping should war break out in Europe.

Admiral Popov, commanding the Pacific Squadron, selected San Francisco as his destination, citing the unfavorable conditions in Russian Far Eastern ports for concentration and resupply. He also noted that while Central and South American republics might be willing to harbor Russian ships, they were also rife with spies from France and England. The United States, strained by Anglo-French interference, emerged as the most logical and secure haven.

The Atlantic Squadron, under the command of Captain Lisovski (promoted to Rear Admiral), consisted of frigates, clippers, and corvettes. His instructions, issued by General-Adjutant Krabbe, emphasized commerce raiding in case of war and granted him considerable latitude in deploying his forces. Notably absent from the orders was any explicit directive to aid the North in the American Civil War. The primary objective was to safeguard the Russian fleet and position it for potential operations against British and French interests in a broader European conflict.

A detailed line drawing of the Russian Frigate OSLIABA, showcasing its rigging and armament. This image provides a visual representation of the type of warship deployed by the Russian Navy during their visit to the United States, highlighting the naval technology of the era.

The arrival of the Russian squadrons in the United States generated immense public enthusiasm. In New York, the arrival of the Atlantic Squadron, led by the flagship Alexander Nevski, was met with a jubilant welcome. Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles extended the hospitality of the Brooklyn Navy Yard for repairs and assistance. The city erupted in celebrations. The New York Daily Tribune described the “Joint Committee” welcoming the Russian visitors, with bands playing Russian and American national airs as Russian seamen cheered from the rigging. Officers, resplendent in their russian navy uniforms, were greeted with banquets and balls.

The russian navy uniforms of the officers were particularly noted for their attractiveness, adorned with “gold lace and embroidery about the collar and cuffs.” These uniforms, a symbol of Tsarist naval power and tradition, became a captivating spectacle for the American public, further enhancing the sense of occasion and the exotic appeal of the Russian visitors. Descriptions of grand balls at the Academy of Music detailed the intermingling of Russian officers and American society, a “wonderful and ‘indescribable phantasmagoria of humanity.'”

A black and white illustration depicting a formal reception on the deck of the Russian flagship ALEXANDER NEVSKI. Admiral Lisovski, presumably in his distinctive russian navy uniform, greets members of the Common Council Committee, illustrating the diplomatic and social interactions during the Russian fleet’s visit to New York.

The Pacific Squadron’s arrival in San Francisco was similarly met with fervor. Admiral Popov and his officers were warmly received, and the Russian sailors earned further goodwill by assisting in fighting a major fire in the city. Popov even boldly declared his intention to fire upon any Confederate ships attempting to enter San Francisco Bay, though this stance was later tempered by instructions from St. Petersburg emphasizing strict neutrality and focusing on humanitarian grounds for intervention if the city itself were threatened.

Despite the public perception of the Russian fleet’s visit as a direct expression of support for the Union cause, the reality was more nuanced. While the visit undoubtedly provided a significant morale boost to the North and served as a tacit warning to European powers contemplating intervention, Russia’s primary motivations were strategic and self-serving. The deployment was designed to protect the Russian fleet in case of European war and to position it for potential commerce raiding, not to directly intervene in the American Civil War.

Nevertheless, the visit had profound diplomatic consequences. It solidified the bond between the United States and Russia, reinforcing their shared interests and mutual goodwill. Secretary of State Seward acknowledged this sentiment, stating, “She has our friendship, in every case, in preference to any other European power, simply because she always wishes us well, and leaves us to conduct our affairs as we think best.” Historian James Ford Rhodes aptly described the visit as adding “another element to the cheerfulness which prevailed in the closing months of 1863” in the North.

In the aftermath of the Civil War, this strengthened relationship played a crucial role in the United States’ purchase of Alaska in 1867. The groundwork laid by the Russian Navy’s visit, fostering trust and cooperation, facilitated the negotiations and ultimately the transfer of Alaska to the United States. The purchase, initially ridiculed as “Seward’s Folly,” proved to be a strategic and resource-rich acquisition.

Even after the sale of Alaska and the initial entente cordiale of the Civil War era faded, the memory of the Russian Navy’s visit and the symbolic presence of their russian navy uniforms in American ports remained a significant chapter in the history of US-Russia relations. It stands as a testament to an unusual alliance forged in a time of global upheaval, driven by pragmatic interests and marked by an unexpected warmth of public reception. While not a direct intervention in the Civil War, the Russian fleet’s visit was a powerful demonstration of international support and a unique episode in naval and diplomatic history.

NOTES

1. Abraham Lincoln’s Address at Cooper Union, New York, 27 Feb. 1860 – The Works of Abraham Lincoln, Speeches and Presidential Addresses, 1859-1865, edited by John H. Clifford & Marion Miller, VOL. V, p 42 (New York, 1907)
2. Central Archive, Moscow, Russia, Foreign Affairs 49, Manuscript Div., Library of Congress, Washington D. C., Dispatch, April 14, 1861 (no number); No. 24, April 14, 1861; No. 38, June 3, 1861.
3. Ibid, No. 23, April 14, 1861.
4. Albert Parry, John B. Turchin: Russian General in the American Civil War, Russian Review, I, 44-60 (April 1942).
5. London PUNCH, XLV, 169 (Oct. 24, 1863).
6. Charles Sumner, His Complete Works (Boston, 1900), X, 144.
7. Daily Richmond Examiner, VOL. XVII, 5 Oct. 1863, No. 173.
8. C. M. Clay, The Life of Cassius Marcellus Clay (1886), I, 415.
9. Albert A. Woldman, Lincoln and the Russians (New York, 1961), p. 121.
10. Ibid, 125.
11. Central Archive, Moscow, Foreign Affairs 49, loc. cit., No. 57, Sept. 9, 1861.
12. Foreign Office, France, VOL. 1446, No. 1236.
13. Ephraim D. Adams, Great Britain and the American Civil War, (London, 1925), VOL. II, 63.
14. Taylor to Seward, Nov. 15, 1863 Diplomatic Correspondence (1863-1864) VOL. 2, pp.844-46 in U. S. Dept. of State Manuscripts 1860-1869, Washington, D. C.
15. Woldman, op.cit., 167.
16. A. M. M., D. K. M. M. (Arkhiv Morskogo Ministerstva, Dielo Kantseliarii Morskogo Ministerstva), No. 91, pt. I.
17. E. A. Adamov, Russia and the United States at the Time of the Civil War. Journal of Modern History, VOL. 2 (1930), pp. 603-7.
18. Ibid, p. 597.
19. Woldman, op. cit., 136.
20. Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, edited by John T. Morse, VOL. I, 443, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1911.
21. Harper’s Weekly, VOL. 7 (Nov. 21, 1863), p. 746.
22. Welles Diary, op. cit., VOL. I, pp. 480-81.
23. Morskoi Sbornik, October 1914, p. 45.
24. Exec. Docs., 38 Cong., I Sess., II, 840 (1863-1864).
25. Ibid, 851.
26. James Ford Rhodes. History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850, VOL. IV, 418, New York: Harper & Bros. and The Macmillan Co., (1893-1919).
27. James Rood Robertson. A Kentuckian at the Court of the Tsars. Berea, Ky.: Berea College Press, 1935.
28. Woldman, op. cit., p. 243.
29. Joseph Florimond Loubat. The Fox Mission to Russia in 1866, edited by John D. Champlin, Jr. (New York). D. Appleton & Co., 1879.
30. Congressional Globe, VOLS. 40-42, Appendix, pp. 386-88.
31. William A. Dunning, Paying for Alaska, Political Science Quarterly, VOL. 27 (1912) September.
32. Frank A. Golder, The Purchase of Alaska. American Historical Review, VOL. 25 (1919-20), p. 424.

Prints obtained from Harper’s Weekly, Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, “Alaska” 1741-1953 by Clarence C. Hulley and Naval History Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations.