By Maj. Charles K. Bartles
Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.
March 11, 2019
Soldiers from the Separate Operational Purpose Division participate in a march during the 2013 Victory Day Parade. Victory Day in Russia is a commemoration of Nazi Germany’s surrender in World War II. (Image courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin*)
History and Roles of Enlisted Professionals in the Russian Armed Forces
Since the early 1990s, the Russian Federation has been actively developing a professional enlisted component within its Armed Forces. This initiative was largely driven by the limitations of the conscription system inherited from the Soviet era. Following World War II, Soviet military doctrine was heavily influenced by their wartime experiences, anticipating future conflicts to mirror the large-scale, high-intensity warfare of the past, albeit with the added dimension of nuclear weapons. This vision necessitated a massive military force, organized into divisions, army groups, and fronts, capable of high-speed maneuver warfare to breach enemy lines and exploit breakthroughs.
To maintain such a vast army without straining the national economy, the Soviet Union upheld its system of universal conscription. The aim was for all male citizens to undergo basic military training during a two-year service period, after which they would return to civilian life, forming a large reserve force to be mobilized in times of crisis. However, this system inadvertently undermined the robust Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) corps that the Soviets had inherited from the Tsarist Army (Imperial Russian Army, 1721-1917). The two-year conscription model offered limited career progression for enlisted personnel seeking long-term military service. Consequently, the strong NCO corps that had emerged after WWII gradually diminished as experienced NCOs either left the military or transitioned to officer ranks. In the Soviet Armed Forces, officers, rather than NCOs, became the primary leaders and trainers at the small unit level.
Two Ratnik infantry machine gunners are photographed at Patriot Park, a military theme park located in Kubinka, Russia, in 2017. Their uniforms and equipment represent the modern advancements in the Russian military. (Image courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin*)
This system started to show its weaknesses as the Soviet Armed Forces underwent rapid modernization in the 1960s and 1970s. Operating and maintaining increasingly sophisticated military technology demanded a highly skilled workforce. The two-year conscription term proved insufficient to adequately train individuals for complex technical roles. As a result, Soviet officers were often required to perform duties typically assigned to NCOs in Western militaries. Recognizing this manpower inefficiency, the Soviet military introduced “warrant officer” positions, primarily to manage the operation and maintenance of advanced equipment. These warrant officers, recruited from conscripts who had completed their initial service, were not highly regarded by the officer corps. The most promising conscripts aspiring to a military career were generally directed towards officer training academies. While warrant officers alleviated some of the technical and small unit leadership burdens on officers, they never achieved institutional prominence and differed significantly from Western NCOs and warrant officers.
Beyond technical roles, warrant officers also filled positions analogous to U.S. first sergeants (though with less authority) and served as platoon leaders in maintenance and supply units. During the 2008 “New Look” reforms, the Russian Federation eliminated all warrant officer positions, converting these roles into contract NCO positions. However, warrant officer billets have since been reinstated. While the distinctions between warrant officer and contract NCO positions remain somewhat unclear, in practice, the differences are minimal. For the purpose of this discussion, the term “enlisted professionals” encompasses Russian warrant officers.
To this day, Russia maintains a hybrid system of conscription and contract service. Within this system, officers retain their role as the primary trainers at the platoon level, rather than NCOs. Prospective lieutenants undergo extensive training, typically attending four- or five-year military academies that combine elements of the U.S. Military Academy and the Basic Officer Leaders Course. Upon graduating and assuming command of a platoon, new lieutenants are immediately responsible for training and discipline. Soviet lieutenants effectively fulfilled the leadership, planning, training, and disciplinary responsibilities of both a U.S. platoon leader and platoon sergeant.
One significant issue that emerged from this system was dedovschina, a system of hazing among conscripts that developed in the absence of consistent NCO supervision, particularly during non-duty hours when lieutenants were off duty. This deeply entrenched, though unofficial, practice involved senior (second-year) conscripts hazing junior (first-year) conscripts. Hazing often included theft, physical abuse, and humiliation, gaining notoriety and causing embarrassment for the government. The severity of dedovschina evolved from a small unit discipline problem into a national security concern, as young men and their families grew apprehensive about conscripted service. Although less prevalent in the modern Russian military, instances of dedovschina still occasionally surface in the media.
The problems associated with dedovschina contributed to the declining popularity of conscription. This unpopularity was further exacerbated by a turbulent economic climate that severely impacted the Russian Armed Forces. Economic hardship hindered progress towards full enlisted professionalization. However, Russia initiated its first “contract NCO” program, offering enlisted soldiers improved pay and benefits, such as the option to live outside of barracks. Russia has continued to operate a hybrid system of conscription and contract service to the present day.
Russian soldiers participate in a Crimson Beret Qualification Exam on August 19, 2013, at the Vityaz Training Center. The crimson beret is a symbol of Russia’s special forces (spetsnaz) and represents a high standard of military professionalism. (Image courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin*)
Russian military leadership has expressed divided opinions regarding the replacement of conscripts with contract NCOs. Some generals have voiced concerns about abolishing conscription, arguing that such a reform would deprive Russia of a substantial strategic reserve with at least basic military training. Other criticisms have labeled contract NCOs as “mercenaries,” drawing a parallel to the U.S. enlistment system and suggesting that contract NCOs are primarily motivated by financial gain rather than patriotic service. However, this argument likely holds limited sway within the Russian military, as both officers and contract enlisted soldiers serve under contractual agreements.
The primary driver for Russian military leadership’s support for developing a contract NCO system stems from lessons learned in Chechnya and other contemporary conflicts. Modern warfare is increasingly characterized by local and regional conflicts, rather than large-scale, high-speed maneuver warfare, which was the Soviet-era focus. Furthermore, modern conflicts involve “indirect and asymmetric methods” and a blurring of tactical, operational, and strategic levels of military operations. This shift implies that conscripts, with their limited one-year service terms, are less effective warfighters in the modern battlefield environment.
Russia has fluctuated between aspirations for a fully professional enlisted force and maintaining the existing hybrid system, albeit with an increasing proportion of contract NCOs. Due to the higher costs associated with contract NCOs and the continued desire to maintain mass mobilization capabilities, Russia is likely to maintain a hybrid enlisted manning system for the foreseeable future.
Russian soldiers from the 4th Guards Kantemirovskaya Tank Division stand behind their BMP-2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle during the annual inspection by the commission of the Western Military District in October 2011. Their field uniforms are practical for training and combat scenarios. (Image courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin*)
A common misconception in the West is that Russian contract sergeants are integrated throughout the ranks and placed in leadership positions over conscripts. However, a more accurate description of Russian contract sergeants (NCOs) might be “enlisted professionals.” In the Russian system, personnel are categorized as either “conscript” or “contract serviceman,” with limited interaction between these two groups. Generally, contract servicemen occupy “trigger puller” positions requiring advanced skills and specialized training. Conscripts typically fill roles demanding minimal training, such as drivers, cooks, laborers, or lower-level maintenance personnel.
Despite the short one-year conscription term limiting extensive military training, conscripts are not necessarily without prior military-related skills. The Russian Federation, continuing a Soviet tradition, emphasizes “patriotic education,” incorporating basic military skills (first aid, etc.) into the primary and secondary education curricula for both male and female students.
The Current Status of Enlisted Professionals
The Russian Armed Forces currently consist of 850,000 active servicemen. Of these, a target of 405,000 were intended to be contract servicemen by the end of 2017. However, Russia has not fully achieved this objective. According to Gen. Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff, as of December 2018, the number of enlisted professionals stood at 384,000. Adding further complexity is the option offered to some conscripts to serve on a two-year contract in lieu of completing the standard one-year conscription period. The precise number of these “2-and-done” contract servicemen is not publicly available, suggesting that a considerable portion of the reported 384,000 contract servicemen may be serving on these shorter contracts, as many young men prefer a two-year contract to a one-year conscription.
Despite ongoing challenges, the Russian Federation has demonstrably improved the quality of life for contract servicemen and enhanced the prestige of military service. The growth in the number of contract servicemen has enabled Russia to reduce conscription quotas. These reduced quotas have facilitated legislative changes allowing young men who reported to draft boards but were not conscripted to be eligible for government employment. Previous legislation had barred both draft evaders and those who reported but were not drafted from government positions. (In certain regions, notably the North Caucasus, military service is highly esteemed, often leading to draft quotas being significantly exceeded. Young men turned away in such situations often faced difficulties finding employment in security services, which are considered prestigious in these areas.) Qualitative improvements are also evident, as noted by Col. Gen. Mikhail Mizintsev, Chief of the Russian Federation National Center for Defense Management:
Over seven or eight years, especially during the last three to four years, the quality of draftees has undoubtedly improved. This is due to the established state policy. Draftee numbers have diminished. But the reduction of their recruitment is actually making it possible to select a smaller number from a larger number for the Armed Forces’ needs. While at the same time raising their quality.
A BMP-2 (amphibious infantry vehicle) driver looks out of the driver’s hatch during the annual inspection by the commission of the Western Military District in October 2011. (Image courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin*)
The Russian enlisted education system differs significantly from the U.S. model. It is not designed to cultivate broadly skilled leaders but rather to develop technically proficient professionals. The Russian system lacks the concept of “key developmental positions” or “out of branch assignments.” Assignments are focused on professional development within a specific field: learning, practicing, or teaching the profession to the next generation. In this respect, the Russian enlisted education system mirrors their officer education system. While Russian enlisted professionals are not viewed primarily as “leaders” in the Western sense, their technical expertise and contributions are highly valued, and the military invests accordingly in their training and development.
The Russian military expresses strong satisfaction with its officer education system and is adopting a similar model for enlisted professional career paths. A notable example is a new three-year, ten-month course for enlisted professionals (specifically warrant officers) at the Aerospace Forces (Air Force) 183rd Training Center at Rostov-on-the-Don, which grants graduates a bachelor’s degree. According to military expert Vladislav Shurygin:
The warrant officers’ main problem was their lack of opportunity of career advancement…They received identical monetary compensation in practically all positions. And they were only able to count on the rank of ‘senior warrant officer’ after several years of service. In order to become officers, warrant officers also needed, just like ordinary citizens, to study for 4-5 years at a military school. This is precisely why there were always never enough warrant officers in the Armed Forces, especially in the positions, which are associated with complex technical work…Now the candidate will obtain a higher, not a vocational education. The incentive will also appear for him to have outstanding service results and to increase his educational level.
Although this bachelor’s degree program is currently unique for Russian enlisted professionals, numerous similar three- to four-year training programs exist. This contrasts sharply with the training approaches for enlisted personnel in the U.S. military.
Another significant difference between the Russian and U.S. military systems lies in the concept of pay. In the U.S., monetary entitlements (including housing allowances) are largely calculated as a percentage of base salary, with rank and years of service being primary determinants. In Russia, base salary is merely the starting point for calculating total compensation. While some entitlements are fixed ruble amounts, the majority are calculated by indexing the base salary by percentages. The aggregate of these additional entitlements typically far exceeds the base salary itself. The two most critical factors determining pay are the serviceman’s rank and assigned position (servicemen receive salaries for both). Rank-based salaries are aligned with equivalent responsibility and skill levels in the federal government, while position salaries are determined by the soldier’s current duty assignment, which must be authorized under a valid table of organization and equipment (TO&E). Positional salaries generally surpass rank-based salaries and are set by the Ministry of Defense.
Figure A14. Graphic translated from “Military Financial Literacy,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, http://www.vpk-news.ru/ articles/27161
This pay structure ensures that a sergeant first class (E7) in a leadership role earns more than a sergeant first class in a staff assignment. This system offers greater flexibility for enlisted professionals. A highly trained soldier with advanced education can earn significantly more than a soldier of the same rank and years of service who performs a less demanding role, such as driving a truck. Furthermore, this system allows well-educated enlisted soldiers to achieve comparable compensation to officers, diminishing the purely financial incentive to seek an officer commission for higher pay.
Contract service also provides benefits such as assignment stability and duty station continuity. The Russian system lacks an “up-or-out” policy, and enlistment contracts specify duty stations. Servicemen can remain at the same duty station indefinitely, although this may limit opportunities for advancement and pay increases. In practice, enlisted professionals often remain at the same duty station but take on different duty assignments as they become available.
Enlisted Professional Accessions
Russia employs a three-stage process for selecting contract serviceman candidates: initial, preliminary, and in-depth (final) selection.
Initial selection is a two-step process, starting with a computer-based assessment on the Russian Ministry of Defense website, designed by the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. This is followed by an interview with an Armed Forces representative at an initial recruiting station, unit of intended service, or local military commissariat (draft board).
Lance Cpl. Svetlana Lebedkova from the 106th Airborne Division participates in the Common Wealth Warrior Competition, an international military skills competition among friendly nations, at the Cultural Center on the Alabino training ground, September 2011. (Image courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin*)
Preliminary selection includes: military orientation; formal application for service; verification of personal data and background (citizenship, academic and employment history, law enforcement checks, and medical documentation); preliminary medical examination; and preliminary psychological examination. If no disqualifying factors are identified, the findings are forwarded to the recruiting station for further review. Both initial and preliminary selection stages can be conducted at the unit of intended service.
In-depth selection is conducted at designated recruiting stations for candidates who successfully pass the preliminary selection. In some cases, preliminary and in-depth selection occur at the same recruiting stations, particularly for local candidates. In-depth selection involves: further verification of personal data and background, comprehensive medical examinations, in-depth psychological evaluations, physical fitness testing, creation of the candidate’s personnel file, and security clearance registration (if required). The selection process concludes with a determination of the candidate’s eligibility for military service. The entire process typically spans from two weeks to six months, depending on factors such as Armed Forces needs, prior civilian education and military training, place of residence, and unit training cycle.
Upon successful assessment into service, new servicemen enter a three-month probationary period. During this time, the commander of the military training unit can discharge the serviceman if deemed in the best interest of the Armed Forces. This probationary status applies both to contract servicemen entering from civilian life and former conscripts transitioning to contract service.
Enlisted Professional Education
In contrast to the U.S. system, the Russian system lacks a centralized basic training program for conscript soldiers. Conscripts are directly assigned to their units after induction and receive initial and on-the-job training within their units. Even specialized skills like airborne training are conducted at the unit level. To establish a professional education system for contract servicemen, Russia has developed guidelines to standardize training for enlisted soldiers and warrant officers across major branches (Ground Forces, Navy, Aerospace Forces) and specialty branches (Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN) and Airborne Troops (VDV)) within the Ministry of Defense.
Soldiers from the 2nd Guards Tamanskaya Motor Rifle Division stand in formation during the Common Wealth Warrior Competition, an international military skills competition among friendly armies, at the Cultural Center on the Alabino training ground, September 2011. (Image courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin*)
This standardization involves defining specific requirements and qualifications for contract service progression throughout their careers. Russia envisions a five-tier career development system for contract servicemen. The first tier focuses on training servicemen for entry-level positions, traditionally filled by conscripts. This training is conducted in two phases. The first phase is a six-week basic training course at 29 training units and 4 higher military educational institutions. The second phase involves attending a Military Occupational School (MOS), with training durations ranging from three to ten months, and some programs extending up to four years. The second phase may be waived if the serviceman enters service with a recognized MOS, such as through a Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and Navy program, vocational school, or equivalent means.
The second tier is for squad leaders, tank commanders, crew leaders, and similar positions. Candidates for second-tier positions are selected from first-tier personnel based on leadership potential and technical proficiency, having served at least two years in a first-tier role. Additional administrative requirements include age, health, education level, physical fitness, and military discipline. They undergo an additional three months of training, which may be conducted at various locations depending on the branch of service and specialty.
The third tier is for platoon leaders and deputy platoon leaders. In the Russian system, contract servicemen often fill platoon leader roles in combat support platoons within battalions. Candidates are nominated by their supervisors and require 3-5 years of service in a tier-two position. They receive an additional three months of training, location dependent on branch and specialty.
The fourth tier targets contract servicemen serving in regiments, brigades, and divisions. Candidates are selected from third-tier contract servicemen with at least 10 years of service. They undergo 3-5 months of staff training at the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School (RVVDKU).
The fifth tier is for contract servicemen serving at the Army Group level and higher echelons. Candidates are drawn from fourth-tier contract servicemen with a minimum of 15 years of service. They receive 3-5 months of staff training at the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School (RVVDKU).
A Russian soldier participates in the 137th Guards Parachute Order of the Red Star Regiment of the 106th Guards Red Banner Order of the Kutuzov Class II Airborne Division tactical exercises. The uniform is adapted for airborne operations. (Image courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin*)
Conclusion
Russia’s journey towards enlisted professionalization has been a complex process since the Soviet era, involving experimentation with various models. While aware of the U.S./Western NCO model, Russia has evaluated and ultimately rejected it as unsuitable for its own military context. Despite understanding the Western system, Russian military leadership believes it is not a good fit due to differences in military decision-making processes, historical context, and social norms. Russia’s objective is not to develop broadly skilled enlisted leaders, but rather technically proficient, narrowly focused, professional enlisted soldiers. Therefore, “enlisted professionals” is arguably a more accurate descriptor for Russian contract servicemen than “noncommissioned officers” in the Western sense.
Russia is still navigating the challenges of enlisted professionalization and has experienced some setbacks. However, there is general satisfaction with the current trajectory. This understanding of the Russian system is valuable for the U.S. and other militaries engaged in training, advising, assisting, and enabling coalition operations. Given the extensive history of Soviet/Russian military training in the Middle East, Africa, Eastern Europe, and Central and South America, partner nations in these regions may find the Russian model of enlisted professionalism more readily adaptable than attempting to transplant the US/Western NCO model to their own armies.
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Notes
*All images by Vitaly Kuzmin are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License except where otherwise noted. Link to the Creative Commons License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Maj. Chuck Bartles is a Russian analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. His research focuses on Russian and Central Asian military force structure, modernization, tactics, officer and enlisted professional development, and Russian military cartography and map symbology. Maj. Bartles also serves as a space operations officer (FA40) in the United States Army Reserve and has deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq. He has served as a security assistance officer at U.S. Embassies in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. Maj. Bartles holds a bachelor’s degree in Russian from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln and a master’s degree in Russian and Eastern European studies from the University of Kansas.
