During the ambitious planning stages for the Ardennes Counteroffensive, better known as the Battle of the Bulge, Adolf Hitler recognized a critical necessity: the swift capture of at least one intact bridge spanning the Meuse River. Speed was paramount to Hitler’s broader strategy, which aimed to drive a wedge between the Allied forces, specifically the US and British armies, cross the Meuse, and ultimately reach the port of Antwerp. Failure to secure a functional Meuse bridge would introduce delays, granting the Allies crucial time to recover from the initial shock and consolidate their defenses west of the river before German forces could advance. To preempt this potentially fatal delay, Hitler entrusted Obersturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny with a clandestine and daring mission: Operation Greif.
In October 1944, Hitler summoned Skorzeny to his headquarters to personally outline the operation. Skorzeny, already known for leading audacious secret missions, including the daring rescue of Benito Mussolini, was tasked with his most expansive and intricate undertaking yet. He was to assemble, equip, and train a special commando unit. This unit would operate in conjunction with the 6th Panzer Army, the spearhead of the offensive’s northern advance. Their objectives extended beyond merely capturing a Meuse bridge; the commandos were also charged with conducting espionage and sabotage operations to create widespread confusion and disruption within the Allied rear areas.
Central to Skorzeny’s plan was the element of deception. He intended to utilize English-speaking German troops disguised in authentic US Army uniforms and using captured American equipment. Hitler, in their briefing, pointed out that the Allies themselves had employed similar tactics in previous engagements. He reassured Skorzeny that the act of wearing American uniforms would only constitute a violation of the laws of war if German soldiers engaged in combat while still in disguise. This distinction, however, would become a point of contention and tragedy for some of Skorzeny’s men.
Skorzeny established his command center at Grafenwöhr, Germany. With a mere six weeks allocated for preparation, the task ahead was immense. Hitler promised unlimited resources, a pledge that, like many pronouncements surrounding the Ardennes Counteroffensive, proved to be an exaggeration. The American equipment promised to Skorzeny fell far short of expectations. He received only a limited number of jeeps, trucks, and halftracks, along with a single Sherman tank. To compensate for these shortages, Skorzeny augmented his primary combat force, designated Panzerbrigade 150, with approximately 70 German tanks ingeniously camouflaged to resemble American armored vehicles. These “Ersatz M10s,” often Panther tanks in disguise, were intended to further the illusion of an American unit operating behind enemy lines.
An Ersatz M10 Panther tank, disguised with American markings, employed by German forces during the Battle of the Bulge. Photo Source
In a significant security lapse, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel disseminated a message across the Wehrmacht, soliciting English-speaking volunteers for a special unit under Skorzeny’s command. Around 2,000 men responded to this call, which also inadvertently alerted Allied intelligence. However, the vast majority of volunteers possessed only a rudimentary grasp of English. Only ten were truly fluent, and a few dozen more could manage basic conversation. From this pool, Skorzeny formed Einheit Stielau, a reconnaissance unit composed of small teams of two to six men. Equipped with jeeps, radios, and some demolition equipment, these men, despite lacking substantial commando experience and undergoing only basic training in the limited timeframe, were tasked with infiltrating Allied lines.
During the rushed training period, a rumor began circulating among the commandos: their mission included the assassination of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander. Despite Skorzeny’s efforts to dispel this rumor, it persisted. Unsurprisingly, American intelligence also picked up on these whispers. Ironically, this unintended consequence became arguably Operation Greif’s most significant, albeit indirect, success. When the Ardennes Counteroffensive commenced on December 16, 1944, reports of German soldiers disguised as Americans operating behind the front lines rapidly surfaced. These reports, often exaggerated the actual number of disguised commandos, yet the capture of several infiltrators solidified the perceived threat as very real. Many captured commandos, possibly to sow further discord or under interrogation pressure, corroborated the assassination rumors, leading Generals Eisenhower and Bradley to take the threat seriously. Consequently, both generals significantly curtailed their public appearances and remained largely confined to their headquarters, arguably hindering their command effectiveness during the critical early stages of the German offensive.
While the direct threat to the Allied generals was never as substantial as initially believed, the Einheit Stielau commandos did achieve some success in creating chaos and confusion. One team, posing as military police at a road intersection, successfully rerouted an entire American regiment in the wrong direction. Another team managed to disrupt communication lines between General Bradley’s headquarters and the First US Army command post. Although the number of commandos was insufficient to execute all the disruptive actions later attributed to them, their acts of sabotage, whether real or imagined, undeniably contributed to the disruption of the American response to the German counteroffensive and negatively impacted Allied morale. The psychological impact far outweighed the limited physical damage they inflicted.
The German counteroffensive initially caught the Allies completely off guard, but it soon encountered stronger-than-anticipated resistance and logistical challenges, causing it to bog down. Panzerbrigade 150’s operational plan depended on a swift breakthrough, which would have provided the necessary conditions for Skorzeny’s disguised troops to effectively infiltrate and operate within American lines. This rapid penetration, however, did not materialize. By the second day of the assault, Skorzeny recognized that the element of surprise and speed was lost. He then reorganized the brigade to function as a conventional combat unit, attached to the 1st SS Panzer Corps. Skorzeny’s direct involvement in the fighting ended abruptly when he was wounded in the face by artillery fire near the Hotel du Moulin in Ligneuville, Belgium.
Wilhelm Schmidt, Günther Billing, and Manfred Pernass, German soldiers captured while participating in Operation Greif. Courtesy of The National World War II Museum.
Meanwhile, the remaining Einheit Stielau commandos continued their mission, but most were either killed or captured by increasingly vigilant American troops. Only a single team managed to return to German lines. On December 18, 1944, in Awaille, Belgium, US troops apprehended three members of Einheit Stielau: Oberfähnrich Günther Billing, Obergefreiter Wilhelm Schmidt, and Unteroffizier Manfred Pernass. A military commission convened on December 21 at the First US Army’s Master Interrogation Center in Belgium. They were charged and tried, found guilty on two counts: violating the laws of war by operating in American uniforms within a combat zone, and acting as spies by gathering intelligence for the enemy while disguised. The commission recommended the death penalty for all three.
German infiltrators, dressed in US uniforms, lined up for execution by firing squad after being convicted by a US military court during the Battle of the Bulge, December 23, 1944. Photo: https://rarehistoricalphotos.com/german-commandos-captured-american-uniform-1944/
Colonel E. M. Brannon of the Staff Judge Advocate conducted the mandatory review of the proceedings the following day, upholding the court-martial’s verdicts. Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges, commander of the First US Army, approved and confirmed the sentences that same afternoon. The executions were carried out the next morning, December 23, 1944. This swift and harsh justice reflected the heightened tensions and anxieties caused by Operation Greif and the perceived threat of disguised enemy soldiers.
For Otto Skorzeny himself, accountability for Operation Greif came after the war’s end. He surrendered to the 30th Infantry Regiment in May 1945 and spent two years in prison awaiting trial. While senior Nazi officers at the Nuremberg trials faced severe penalties, including death and life imprisonment, Skorzeny’s trial at the General Military Government Court in Dachau began in August 1947. In his testimony, Skorzeny admitted to his role in the commando operation. However, with the assistance of his US-appointed defense attorney, Colonel Robert Durst, Skorzeny skillfully argued his case. He highlighted instances where American troops had also worn German uniforms, such as during the fighting in Aachen, and maintained that he had instructed his commandos to remove their American uniforms before engaging in combat – a claim often disputed.
Ultimately, crucial testimony from Royal Air Force officer Wing Commander Forest Yeo-Thomas proved decisive in swaying the court. Yeo-Thomas, a British agent known to the Germans as “The White Rabbit,” recounted his own experiences escaping German captivity by disguising himself and fellow prisoners in enemy uniforms. He argued that Skorzeny’s actions were not fundamentally different. Unlike the military commission that condemned Schmidt, Billing, and Pernass, the Dachau court operated under international laws of war, which stipulated that wearing enemy uniforms was a war crime only if combat occurred while disguised. Based on this legal interpretation, and bolstered by Yeo-Thomas’s compelling testimony, the court acquitted Skorzeny and his co-defendants.
Otto Skorzeny (left) with President of Argentina Juan Perón (center). Post-WWII, Skorzeny found refuge and influence in Argentina. Photo: Wikimedia Commons
Skorzeny remained in prison pending the decision of a denazification court until July 1948, when he famously escaped, reportedly with the aid of former SS officers disguised in US military police uniforms. He subsequently claimed that his escape was facilitated by US intelligence agencies. In 1952, while residing in Spain, Skorzeny was recruited by a former German general with CIA connections to train the Egyptian army. He later lived in Argentina, where he was rumored to be an advisor to President Juan Perón and a bodyguard to Perón’s wife, Eva Perón. In the 1960s, he was even recruited by the Mossad, although the extent of his collaboration and the nature of his missions remain subjects of speculation. Otto Skorzeny died of lung cancer in Madrid in January 1975. His ashes were returned to Vienna, his birthplace, where former SS officers held a memorial service. He remains a controversial historical figure, viewed by some as a war criminal and unrepentant Nazi, while others romanticize him as a daring adventurer and a pioneer of modern commando warfare. His legacy is inextricably linked to Operation Greif and the complex moral and legal questions surrounding deception and disguise in war, particularly the use of enemy uniforms, like Ww11 German Uniforms repurposed for infiltration, even if the operation itself ultimately fell short of its strategic goals.
