During the desperate final months of World War II, as the Allied forces pushed relentlessly into Nazi Germany, Adolf Hitler conceived a bold and audacious plan. This strategy was for the Ardennes Counteroffensive, famously known as the Battle of the Bulge. A critical element for the success of this offensive was speed, aiming to split the Allied armies, cross the Meuse River, and ultimately reach Antwerp. Central to this rapid advance was the capture of bridges, particularly those crossing the Meuse. Hitler understood that any delay in securing these river crossings would allow the Allies to regroup and fortify their defenses, dooming the German offensive. To ensure the swift capture of these vital bridges and to sow confusion behind enemy lines, Hitler entrusted Obersturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny with a highly secretive and unconventional mission: Operation Greif.
Otto Skorzeny, already renowned for his daring rescue of Benito Mussolini, was summoned by Hitler in October 1944 to receive his personal instructions. Operation Greif was to be Skorzeny’s most ambitious undertaking yet. He was tasked with forming and leading a special commando unit that would operate in conjunction with the 6th Panzer Army, the spearhead of the German northern advance. Their objectives extended beyond simply seizing bridges. Skorzeny’s commandos were to engage in espionage and sabotage, creating widespread chaos and disruption within the Allied rear areas.
The cornerstone of Skorzeny’s plan was deception. He proposed to infiltrate Allied lines using English-speaking German soldiers disguised in authentic US Army uniforms and equipment. Hitler, convinced that the Allies themselves had employed similar tactics, authorized the operation. He reassured Skorzeny that wearing enemy uniforms was not a violation of the laws of war as long as the disguised soldiers did not engage in combat while in disguise. This controversial interpretation would later become a point of contention in war crime trials.
Skorzeny established his command headquarters at Grafenwöhr, Germany. Time was of the essence, with only six weeks to prepare for the Ardennes Offensive. Despite Hitler’s promise of unlimited resources, Skorzeny found himself facing significant shortages. The promised influx of captured American equipment was far less than anticipated. He received only a limited number of jeeps, trucks, halftracks, and a single Sherman tank. To compensate for these deficiencies, Skorzeny’s main combat force, Panzerbrigade 150, was equipped with approximately 70 German tanks ingeniously camouflaged to resemble American armored vehicles. These “Ersatz M10s,” Panthers disguised as M10 tank destroyers, were a testament to the ingenuity and desperation of the operation.
A knocked out Ersatz M10 with both its hull and turret American markings displayed. Photo Source
Adding to the operational challenges, a major security breach occurred. Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel issued a widespread request across the Wehrmacht for English-speaking volunteers for a special unit under Skorzeny’s command. This message, intended to recruit personnel, inadvertently alerted Allied intelligence to the existence of a peculiar German operation. While around 2,000 men responded, the vast majority possessed only rudimentary English skills. Only a handful were truly fluent, and a few dozen more could manage basic conversations. From this pool, Skorzeny formed Einheit Stielau, a reconnaissance unit composed of small teams of two to six men. Equipped with jeeps, radios, and demolition charges, these men, despite lacking significant commando training and adequate preparation time, were tasked with infiltrating deeply into Allied territory.
During the rushed training period, rumors began circulating among the commandos, fueled by speculation and the secrecy surrounding their mission. The most prominent rumor was that Operation Greif included the assassination of General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Despite Skorzeny’s efforts to dispel these rumors, they persisted and even reached American intelligence. Ironically, this unfounded rumor had a significant, albeit unintended, impact on the Allied response to the Ardennes Offensive.
When the German counteroffensive commenced on December 16, 1944, reports of German soldiers in American uniforms operating behind Allied lines spread rapidly. These reports, amplified by fear and uncertainty, led to exaggerated estimates of the number of German commandos involved. However, the capture of even a small number of these infiltrators was enough to make the threat seem very real to the Allied command. Many captured commandos, possibly encouraged by Skorzeny or simply seeking to sow further discord, repeated the assassination rumors to their captors. This atmosphere of paranoia led Generals Eisenhower and Bradley to significantly restrict their movements and remain within their headquarters, hindering their ability to effectively direct the Allied response to the German assault during the crucial early days of the offensive.
While the threat to Allied generals was overstated, the actions of Einheit Stielau commandos did contribute to the chaos within Allied lines. One team, posing as military police at a key intersection, successfully rerouted an entire American regiment. Another team managed to sever communication lines between General Bradley’s headquarters and the First US Army command post. Although the actual number of commandos was too small to account for all the disruptions attributed to them, their acts of sabotage, coupled with the pervasive fear of infiltration, significantly hampered the American response and negatively impacted troop morale.
The Ardennes Counteroffensive, despite achieving initial surprise, soon faltered in the face of unexpectedly strong Allied resistance and logistical challenges. Panzerbrigade 150, reliant on a rapid breakthrough for its disguised operations to be effective, found itself bogged down. By the second day of the offensive, Skorzeny recognized that Operation Greif’s initial concept was no longer viable. He reorganized the brigade to fight as a conventional unit, attached to the 1st SS Panzer Corps. Skorzeny’s personal involvement in the fighting ended abruptly when he was wounded by artillery fire near Ligneuville, Belgium.
Wilhelm Schmidt, Günther Billing, and Manfred Pernass, after their capture by American troops. Courtesy of The National World War II Museum.
Meanwhile, the scattered teams of Einheit Stielau continued their mission, but most were quickly apprehended by increasingly vigilant American forces. Only one team is known to have successfully returned to German lines. On December 18, 1944, in Awaille, Belgium, US troops detained three members of Einheit Stielau: Oberfähnrich Günther Billing, Obergefreiter Wilhelm Schmidt, and Unteroffizier Manfred Pernass. They were swiftly brought before a military commission on December 21 at the First US Army’s Master Interrogation Center in Belgium. The commission found them guilty on two counts: violating the laws of war by wearing American uniforms in a combat zone and acting as spies while disguised to gather intelligence. The recommended sentence was death for all three.
German infiltrators lined up for execution by firing squad after conviction by a military court for wearing U.S. uniforms during the Battle of the Bulge. December 23, 1944. Photo: https://rarehistoricalphotos.com/german-commandos-captured-american-uniform-1944/
Colonel E. M. Brannon, the Staff Judge Advocate, reviewed the proceedings and upheld the court-martial’s findings. Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges, commander of the First US Army, approved the sentences, and the executions were carried out by firing squad on December 23, 1944. These executions highlighted the severe consequences faced by soldiers engaging in combat while disguised in enemy uniforms, according to the prevailing interpretation of the laws of war at the time.
Otto Skorzeny’s accountability for Operation Greif came after the war. He surrendered to the 30th Infantry Regiment in May 1945 and spent two years in prison awaiting trial. At his trial in Dachau in August 1947, Skorzeny admitted his role in Operation Greif. However, with the assistance of his defense attorney, Colonel Robert Durst, he argued that his commandos were instructed to remove their American uniforms before engaging in combat. He also pointed out instances where American troops had themselves used German uniforms.
Crucially, testimony from Royal Air Force Wing Commander Forest Yeo-Thomas, known as “The White Rabbit,” proved decisive. Yeo-Thomas recounted his own experiences of escaping German captivity while disguised in enemy uniforms, arguing that Skorzeny’s actions were no different. The court at Dachau, operating under international laws of war, ruled that wearing enemy uniforms was only a war crime if combat occurred while disguised. Based on this legal interpretation and Yeo-Thomas’s compelling testimony, the charges against Skorzeny and his co-defendants were dropped.
Skorzeny (left) with President of Argentina Juan Perón (center). Photo: Wikimedia Commons
Skorzeny’s postwar life remained controversial. He escaped denazification court custody in 1948, reportedly with the help of former SS officers disguised as US military police. He later worked as an advisor to the Egyptian army, and was rumored to be associated with Argentinian President Juan Perón and even the Israeli Mossad. Otto Skorzeny died in Madrid in 1975. His legacy remains complex, viewed by some as a war criminal and by others as a daring commando pioneer. Operation Greif, and the use of American uniforms by German soldiers, especially those with backgrounds in units like the Waffen-SS, remains a fascinating and controversial episode of World War II, highlighting the shadowy world of wartime deception and its legal and ethical ramifications.
